An important contribution of economics to public policy rests on the precept that price signals should force producers of externalities to internalize the welfare of other economic agents. Pigou (1920)'s celebrated insight on the taxation of externalities provided an intellectual foundation for a variety of policies from pollution taxes/permits to experience rating. Pigovian taxation's policy appeal is limited if the polluter has insufficient resources to pay the damage when it occurs. To defend Pigovian taxation in the presence of judgment-proof agents, its proponents point at the many institutions extending liability to third parties. Yet little is known about the validity of Pigou's analysis in this context. The paper analyzes the costs and benefits of extended liability and investigates whether full internalization is called for in the presence of agency costs between potential polluters and providers of guarantees. Its contribution is two-fold. It first shows that the better the firms' corporate governance and the stronger their balance sheet, the more closely taxes should track the corresponding externality. It then develops the first analysis of extended liability when guarantors themselves may be judgment-proof and the extension of liability may give rise to further externalities. Relatedly, it derives the curvature of the optimal taxation of externalities in a multiplant firm.
Introduction
An important contribution of economics to public policy rests on the precept that price signals should force producers of externalities to internalize the welfare of other economic agents. Pigou (1920) 's celebrated insight on the taxation of externalities provides an intellectual foundation for a variety of policies from pollution taxes/permits to experience rating; it also underlies the expectation damages remedy for breach in commercial law.
From a policy perspective, though, Pigou's internalization principle -the requirement that the polluter pay the damage inflicted on the pollutee -raises the concern that the polluter have insufficient resources to pay the damages when it occurs. In legal terms, the polluter may be "judgment-proof". Shallow pockets may substantially reduce the policy appeal of Pigovian taxation. And indeed, many environmental, personal or financial obligations are evaded through bankruptcy and abandonment of operations.
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Proponents of Pigovian taxation retort that, in the presence of solvency concerns, potential polluters should be forced to contract with other corporate entities or financial intermediaries who will step in and guarantee payments in case of damage. Such extended liability prevents polluters from escaping their duties.
In support of this view, many vehicles for extending liabilities to a third party have developed, either spontaneously or through regulation, 2 over the years. Mandatory car insurance covers damages inflicted on third parties. Banks and governments guarantee firms' payments to suppliers (through letters of credit) or workers (through unemployment insurance funds). Deposit insurance funds and capital adequacy requirements protect depositors against poor risk management by financial institutions. In some payment systems, banks can increase their overdraft facility by securing some guarantee from other banks. Manufacturing units often benefit from an explicit or implicit backing of external claims by a parent company. Extended liability is also ubiquitous for environmental damages.
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This paper revisits Pigovian thinking by considering financially constrained agents monitored by financial intermediaries, business partners, or parent companies. The framework is otherwise a standard one in which the agent, a firm, may impose a negative externality on a third party, a worker, the environment or the taxpayer. The firm, run by an entrepreneur, has limited financial resources. The State can demand extended liability, that is ask the intermediary to pay part of or the full penalty when the firm is judgmentproof. Extending liability however can improve welfare only if the intermediary has more information than the State. In the tradition of corporate finance, the paper thus assumes that the intermediary acts as a delegated monitor. As usual in that field, the income that is pledgeable to financial intermediaries is not the firm's total surplus, as the entrepreneur enjoys a rent.
Several questions can be raised in this context. First, what are the costs of extended liability? Should firms and their guarantors be held accountable for the full externality, as Pigou suggested, or , to the contrary, should some of the social cost be socialized? Second, can the extension of liability to other industrial companies jeopardize otherwise healthy activities?
The paper obtains two sets of insights:
(1) Well-diversified guarantors. We first assume that the guarantor is never judgment proof himself. One may have in mind a well-diversified financial intermediary. As we show, a natural benchmark principle is then the "delegation principle": Because the guarantor is better informed about the potential tortfeasor than the State, the cost of the externality should be passed through to the guarantor, who then writes an optimal secondbest contract with the firm. This delegation principle extends the validity of Pigovian reasoning to firms with limited funds but potential guarantors.
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We derive conditions under which this delegation principle holds, and unveil two exceptions. The first departure from the delegation principle occurs when the contract between the firm and the intermediary is not second best due to ex post renegotiation. We find that a partial extension of liability, by strengthening the intermediary's bargaining position, helps the firm obtain financing and raises social welfare. We relate the extension of liability to the firm's strength of balance sheet and to the quality of monitoring. In particular, liability is extended more, the stronger the firm's balance sheet. liability then favors financially weak firms, who are more likely to cause the damage, to the detriment of stronger ones. Limited extended liability allows the State to keep the financially weak firms "on board" while keeping externalities at a reasonable level.
(2) Snowball effects and judgment-proof guarantors. Parent companies, customers, suppliers, or other industrial companies may be best placed to monitor the potential tort-
feasor. An extension of liability to them may jeopardize their own activities. That is, judgment proofness may propagate through the guaranteeing chain. Similarly, banks may face hardship when the borrowers they guarantee fail, and re-insurers may not be able to cover the insurance companies' losses. Worse still, the extension of liability may lead to the extension of externalities. For example, a monitor who is asked to cover the cost of layoffs by the monitoree may be forced to lay workers off himself.
Such snowball effects are investigated in a tractable "nested information structure" model of independent interest. To reflect the possibility that guarantors themselves be judgment-proof, we consider a model with n ex ante symmetric firms with limited funds and mutually monitoring each other. Each firm faces uncertainty; for example, in the layoff interpretation, each firm may face a productivity shock that makes continued employment less attractive. Using the employment interpretation as an illustration, the realization of uncertainty unfolds in the following way: First, a random number m ∈ {0, · · · , n} of firms are unviable, leading to as many closures. Second, the common productivity y of the n − m remaining and potentially viable firms is drawn from a continuous distribution
The number m is called the "breadth" of the shock, while the distributions G n−m (·) are ordered through the standard hazard-rate comparison, giving rise to a notion of "depth" of the shock. The State knows neither the breadth nor the depth of the shock.
It is shown that it is optimal to (partially) extend liability if breadth and depth are negatively correlated. Intuitively, if the shock on potentially viable firms is likely to be small (in a stochastic sense) when other firms shut down, then recovering the cost of the externality through extended liability creates only limited snowball effects.
By contrast, liability is not extended (despite mutual monitoring) when shocks are independent. And liability is "negatively extended" (virtuous firms receive support when others create externalities) if breadth and depth are positively correlated. The overarching principle is thus the use of the information conveyed by the existence of externalities about the ability of others to bear extended liability. The other key lesson is that snowball effects substantially mitigate the benefits of extended liability.
This n-firm snowball effect admits a re-interpretation in terms of a single, financially constrained firm with n different activities. The results then imply that the per-layoff tax schedule is decreasing (respectively constant, increasing) with the number of layoffs if the breadth and the depth of the shock are negatively (respectively not, positively) correlated.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the basic model, and shows that it applies to a variety of policy environments, including experience rating, environmental taxation and prudential regulation. Section 3 derives the optimal level of extended liability when firms are ex ante homogenous and shows how policy should account for the firms' balance sheet strength and for capital market imperfections. It then extends the analysis to ex ante firm heterogeneity. Section 4 investigates the extension of liability to other industrial companies and analyzes snowball effects. Finally, section 5 concludes with potential alleys for research.
Relationship to the literature:
There is by now a large literature on the effects of extended liability on the level of environmental care, which I will not try to review exhaustively (a useful collection of state-of-the-art contributions can be found in Boyer et al 2007) . This paper differs from this literature in several important respects. First, unlike a number of papers it allows a full range of instruments for the government. Namely, the latter can set up a fund (for example, a deposit or unemployment insurance fund) collecting money from firms regardless of whether they exert externalities. The absence of a fund creates a role for third parties as conduits for the State; with full instrument range by contrast, the financial intermediary or business partner is not needed for levying the contribution to the fund and extended liability makes sense only if the financial intermediary or business partner monitors the tortfeasor. We accordingly cast the argument in a (rather general) corporate finance framework.
Second, it focuses on different effects; in particular, starting from the delegation principle as a Pigovian benchmark, it unveils three factors, the renegotiation of financial contracts, the heterogeneity of firms, and snowball effects that call for limits to extended liability. It also contains the first analysis of extended liability with financially constrained guarantors. Pitchford (1995) makes the important points that the tortfeasor's incentives to exert care need to be preserved, and that an increase in lender liability, because it must be offset by a payment to the lender in the absence of accident, reduces the tortfeasor's incentives.
Thus in such an "efficiency wage framework" in which managerial incentives are traded off against rents, full extended liability is in general dominated by partial lender liability.
The lender in the model is a conduit for government policy, collecting income from the firm on the government's behalf as the government cannot levy contributions to a fund in the absence of accident; the (partial) extension of liability is one way of implementing 5 the government's optimal policy and is not needed if the government can impose direct liability and collect taxes for a fund, as is assumed in this paper. Balkenborg (2001) extends Pitchford's analysis by assuming that the lender has market power instead of being competitive.
Several papers (e.g., Boyer-Laffont 1997 , Balkenborg 2004 ) have analyzed extended liability in an adverse selection context. Boyer and Laffont consider a Bolton-Scharfstein (1990) model of refinancing. They first show that the firm optimally avoids the common agency externality that arises when one entity finances the investment and another guarantees the liability. The government chooses a level of liability and trades off the tortfeasor's informational rent and the shadow cost of public funds. When the latter is low, the bank does not renew its financing often enough from a social efficiency perspective; less-than-full extended liability is then one way of subsidizing the firm and thereby reinforcing its balance sheet. Subsidization of credit constrained firms is always suboptimal in our model since the government puts no (or less than full) weight on their welfare, and so the Boyer-Laffont effect is absent. Martimort (2006, 2007) , like this paper, allow for a full range of instru- Finally, the paper ignores monitoring incentives by the State. This is of course a gross oversimplification. In practice, the State defines standards, checks guarantors' solvency, and monitors firm behavior both ex ante and ex post (for example through court investigations, as in Boyer-Porrini 2008) . The effects studied in this paper would however also be present with a more pro-active State.
Model

Set up
Because experience rating is one of the most important policy applications of Pigovian taxation we will couch our model in a labor context; as we will later show, simple rela-bellings transform the model into ones of environmental taxation or prudential regulation.
The model is similar to that in Blanchard-Tirole (2008) , except for the assumption that firms have shallow pockets and may resort to financial intermediaries. Tastes and technology are as follows:
• The economy is composed of a continuum of mass 1 of workers, a continuum of mass (at least) 1 of entrepreneurs, and the State.
• Entrepreneurs are risk neutral. Each entrepreneur can start and run a firm. There is a fixed cost of creating a firm, I, which is the same for all entrepreneurs.
If a firm is created, a worker is hired, and the productivity of the match is then revealed. Productivity is given by y and is drawn from cdf G(y), with density g(y) on (−∞, +∞). The firm can either keep the worker and produce, or lay the worker off, who then becomes unemployed. Realizations are iid across firms; that is, there is no aggregate risk.
The entrepreneur, but neither the worker nor the State (also called the "employment insurance fund" or "government"), observes y. 6 The worker and the State observe only whether the worker remains employed or not.
The entrepreneur has initial assets A ≥ 0 and is protected by limited liability. A can exceed or be smaller than I. We assume that the firms have the same net worth and so are ex ante identical. Section 3.3 extends the analysis to allow for ex ante firm heterogeneity, but for the moment we keep the model as simple as possible in order to highlight the key features.
6 In particular, and as we will posit, the State can levy a layoff tax, but cannot engage in ex post monitoring to try to assess whether the layoff was "justified". In contrast, Hiriart et al (2007) allow ex post monitoring as well as ex ante monitoring in a model in which the firm can collude with its monitor(s). They analyze whether the ex ante and ex post monitoring functions should be merged or separated.
• Workers are risk averse, with utility function U (.). When remaining employed, a worker receives wage w and utility U (w). Absent unemployment benefits, utility if unemployed is given by U (b) (so b is the wage equivalent of being unemployed). When receiving unemployment benefit μ, the unemployed worker has utility U (b + μ). Workers are not subject to moral hazard, either on the job or when unemployed.
7 They just need to be insured.
Assumption 1 (positive net present value)
• The government collects payroll tax τ and layoff tax f and distributes unemployment benefit μ. We could allow the State to set a job creation subsidy σ (σ negative in case of a tax), but this instrument is redundant if the firm is financed by a deep-pocket intermediary as we will assume for the moment.
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"Full experience rating" corresponds to f = μ, i.e. to a contribution rate c ≡ f/μ equal to 1. The government must break even and aims to maximize the workers' expected utility (more generally, the results in this paper hold as long as the government puts more weight on workers than on firms). Given policy {τ, f, μ} and the entrepreneurs' freeentry condition and/or the financiers' break-even condition, the wage w will be market determined. Thus even though the government does not directly set w, its policy indirectly sets it, and so in the optimizations below we will just consider that the government sets w through proper choices of instruments.
We posit the existence of an (endogenous) cutoff productivity y above which the firm continues and retains the worker (as will be the case in the examples below). 9 The State's goal is to maximize the workers' expected utility over instruments {τ, f, μ}:
7 See Blanchard-Tirole (2008) for an analysis of the impact of worker incentive considerations on optimal employment protection in an environment in which firms do not face financial constraints. Incomplete worker insurance (due to moral hazard on the job or aimed at providing job search incentives) implies that a dismissal exerts a negative externality both on the unemployment insurance fund and on the dismissed worker; calling for more-than-full experience rating (a related result is in Mongrain-Roberts 2005, who show that the absence of unemployment insurance calls for excessive retention).
8 It is also redundant if there is no intermediary and the firm has enough funds to finance the initial investment (A ≥ I). So its only purpose is to make up for a stand-alone firm's missing equity, I − A, if any.
9 The private determination of a cut-off y is the analog of the choice of prevention care in environmental economics models. Both are moral hazard variables that impact the level of externalities. See Section 2.4.
Its budget constraint writes:
(2)
We will later add two constraints to this maximization problem: the entrepreneurs' participation and financing constraints.
• Investors. There are deep-pocket, risk-neutral (or well-diversified) investors. If these investors are uninformed (i.e., if like the State, they cannot observe productivity directly, just whether workers are employed or unemployed), their presence does not alter the set of feasible utilities. Whatever the investors do, the State could already do by itself.
Accordingly, and in line with the policy-oriented literature, 10 we assume that investors act as delegated monitors. Until Section 3.4, we will assume that the presence of a monitor is socially optimal. Section 3.4 will relax this assumption and consider the possibility of doing without extended liability.
Like in the corporate finance literature, though, monitoring is imperfect and costly, and the entrepreneur enjoys a rent in case of continuation; non-pledgeable income can be viewed as an incompressible managerial rent. In general, managerial rents can take a variety of forms.
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Assumption 2 In the presence of external financing, the entrepreneur's realized rent is a non-decreasing function of realized productivity y and a non-increasing function of the cut-off y above which production occurs and the worker is retained:
R = R(y, y).
The entrepreneur's rent is equal to 0 in case of shutdown.
The no-rent-if-shutdown property will result from optimal contracting between entrepreneurs and investors in the examples below.
Investors, who are competitive and have deep pockets, lend I − A to entrepreneurs (if I > A; otherwise, we can adopt the accounting convention that they receive A − I). They incur monitoring cost m ≥ 0. In order to shorten the exposition, we ignore potential incentive issues with regard to monitoring: Investors subject to extended liability indeed incur the cost m of monitoring. One may have in mind that the investors spend a screening cost m (otherwise, they are exposed to liability on other types of "bad firms"), that, as a byproduct make them knowledgeable about the entrepreneur's activity and write the financial contracts as posited above.
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Investors cannot receive ex post more than the pledgeable portion y − R(y, y) of the firm's income. As in Hiriart-Martimort (2006) , we view the firm and its investors as forming a coalition that reacts optimally to the government's policy. In particular, the coalition sets the threshold y under which the firm lays the worker off.
Example 1 (ex post bargaining): Suppose that the investors observe realized productivity y, but that the entrepreneur is indispensable for production and can capture a fraction β ∈ (0, 1] of the ex post rent of the entrepreneur-financiers coalition through ex post bargaining about managerial compensation.
Given policy {μ, τ, f }, the coalition wants to continue whenever this raises the joint payoff of the entrepreneur and the investors:
The rent from continuation to be shared is then
Ex post bargaining about managerial compensation 13 allocates a fraction β (the entrepreneur's bargaining power) to the entrepreneur:
The parameter β can be viewed as a measure of "bad governance." In more general models of corporate finance, the index of governance quality is taken to be the fraction of income (here, 1 − β) that investors can put their hands on. So, by a slight abuse of terminology, we will say that corporate governance improves when β decreases.
Example 2 (stealing or incentive payment):
Suppose that the entrepreneur can steal a fraction β of realized income. Equivalently, βy could be associated with an incentive 12 Relaxing this assumption would lead us to add the constraint that the entrepreneur not sign contracts with non-monitoring investors. It is immediate to check that the extra constraint is non-binding in the "ex ante contracting" case below. With ex post contracting, one can find conditions under which nonmonitoring contracts are not viable.
13 A rather different analysis of ex post bargaining is conducted in Blanchard-Tirole (2008) . There, under ex post wage bargaining (firms and workers bargain over wages after investments have been sunk), an increase in the layoff tax makes it easier for workers to capture some of the upside profit. Given the firms' breakeven condition, these upside gains are offset by lower wages or lower unemployment benefits when the firm is less productive, destroying insurance overall. Ex post wage bargaining thus calls for lessthan-full experience rating. Note that bargaining occurs between the firm and the workers and that the latter are risk averse. Risk aversion is key to the extent that ex post wage bargaining destroys insurance. Here the firm and its financiers are both risk neutral. payment aimed at preventing the entrepreneur from taking (output-contingent) private benefit. Then
The monitoring cost can in this example be viewed as a cost required to prevent the entrepreneur from stealing the entire output.
Example 3 (perks and prestige from office): Suppose that the entrepreneur enjoys nonmonetary private benefit B from being in office and that layoffs coincide with firm shutting and therefore job loss for the entrepreneur.
14 Then R(y, y) = B 1 1 {y≥y} .
In the presence of a private benefit, we adopt the convention that total productivity y includes the private benefit B, so the monetary revenue is only y − B.
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As we will see, Examples 2 and 3 lead to identical policy implications; so does the more general functional form for the rent function
The key difference between this functional form and that of Example 1 is that the entrepreneur's rent conditional on continuation is independent of the cut-off y and therefore is not affected by policy measures that change this cut-off. We will later show that this difference has no impact on the characterization of the optimal policy, but that it affects substantially the way the policy is implemented.
and
denote the expected rent and net productivity for cut-off y.
Assumption 2 implies that the entrepreneur ex post benefits from a more lenient continuation policy:
Corollary 1 (entrepreneur stake in a lenient continuation rule)
The expected net productivity N(y) is single-peaked and is maximized at y = b.
Assumption 3 (single peakedness of investor revenue)
The function N(y)−R(y) is single-peaked in the cut-off y. From Corollary 1, its maximum is reached at some y * > b.
The cut-off rule y * that maximizes pledgeable income is given by:
and is unique provided that the cumulative distribution G satisfies the standard monotone
In Examples 2 and 3, N − R is trivially single-peaked, with
that is:
The problem of the investors/entrepreneur coalition
The net value for the coalition is given by:
Because the investors break even, the entire surplus goes to the entrepreneur, who therefore receives net utility:
16 The entrepreneur's gross utility is then A + (V E − I − m).
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To produce, the entrepreneur must secure financing from the investors. Given the presence of non-pledgeable income, the maximum amount that the entrepreneur can pledge is given by:
And so, for investors to be willing to lend funds in amount I − A, the following condition must hold:
The entrepreneur will not receive more than R(y, y) whenever the financing constraint (5) is binding.
Optimal contract between entrepreneur and investors
Let us begin with Examples 2 (stealing) and 3 (perks), and their generalized rent function r(y)1 1 {y≥y} . Given w, τ and f ,
Let y + be defined (uniquely since increments in r are less than unitary) by:
The optimal contract between the entrepreneur and the investors is illustrated graphically in 
Figure 2 17 Note that y + is defined in a way analogous to y * , but for an arbitrary institutional environment {w, τ, f }, while y * is relative to the more specific situation in which the "net wage bill" is equal to the worker's opportunity cost w
For A ≥ A 1 , the bilaterally efficient cut-off y = w +τ −f prevails, as it allows investors to break even. For A 1 > A ≥ A 2 , the entrepreneur, whose preferred cut-off is w + τ − f , must make a concession to investors and accept less continuation (increase y). When A falls to A 2 (y goes to y + ), though, no more concessions can raise the pledgeable income and the investment can no longer be financed.
In 
Optimal government policy
Using the government budget constraint
to eliminate taxes from the constraints, the optimization problem can be stated as:
At the optimum, the workers are fully insured:
And so we can rewrite the optimal government policy program as:
subject to the entrepreneur's participation and investors' breakeven constraints:
14 Program I can be rewritten as:
Reinterpretations
While we couched our model in terms of labor regulation, the same program (I), with slight changes in notation, captures several other important applications of the Pigovian principle.
Environmental taxation. A firm has uncertain productivity y with distribution G on (−∞, +∞). It further uses a facility that will require a clean-up cost γ whether it continues operating or not. The pollution damage in the absence of depollution is D. Thus the first-best continuation threshold is y = 0. Each active firm incurs the cost γ of keeping its site clean, and contributes a tax τ to a government environmental fund, that may cover some of the depollution costs associated with firms that have ceased operations. Let X denote the fraction of bankrupt firms' pollution that is eliminated through this fund. The fund's budget constraint is:
where f is the firm (entrepreneur plus investors)'s liability.
We assume that the State wants firms to exist (they deliver some sufficiently large benefit, which we omit). Letting, as earlier, R y, y denote the entrepreneurial rent in case of continuation, the State's objective is to minimize the pollution cost:
subject to the positive NPV conditions for entrepreneur and investors: and is a special case of program (I).
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3 The extension of liability to financial intermediaries
The social optimum
Returning to Program I, we are led to consider four regions:
In this region, the production-efficient policy (y = b) is optimal and is implemented through "Pigovian" full experience rating (f = μ). The financing constraint (7) is not binding and μ is determined by (6):
The entrepreneur's minimum net worth for this regime to prevail is given by:
That is, the entrepreneur must have enough cash up front to pay for its future rent under production-efficient continuation. More generally, full experience rating prevails when the agency cost is small and A is large. In the following, we will progressively reduce A, but a similar exercise can be performed with respect to an increase in the agency cost.
In this region, efficient production y = b does not generate enough pledgeable income.
The firm must shut down over a wider range of realizations of y in order to boost pledgeable income.
Pledgeable income is raised by increasing y toward y * (where y * was defined in Assumption 3 as the maximizer of N − R). In this region, both the entrepreneur's participation constraint (6) and the financing constraint (7) are binding and
Then
A * * is given by:
(c) Weak balance sheet
Pledgeable income can no longer be increased once the cut-off y * has been reached.
In this third region, only the financing constraint (7) is binding (the firm enjoys an ex ante rent) and
This region holds as long as investment benefits workers, i.e. μ > 0.
(d) Destitute firms
Finally, if the value of μ given by (9) is negative, investment is not consistent with the workers' interests. When the net worth falls below A * * , increasing the probability of liquidation further (ȳ aboveȳ * ) hurts even investors and therefore no longer attracts them. Wage (and unemployment benefit) then make up one-for-one for the lack of funds.
y)]dG(y) − I + A
Figure 3
The resulting cut-off rule, expressed as a function of the firm's balance sheet strength (measured by A), is depicted in Figure 4 . 
Implementation: modified Pigovian taxation
A key focus of the implementation of the optimal allocation is the extent to which the firm internalizes the cost μ that a layoff imposes on the unemployment insurance fund.
This (gross) contribution rate c is defined by c ≡ f μ and is unitary under Pigovian taxation.
Note that an a priori better definition (which we will use in Sections 3.3 and 4) is in terms of the net contribution:
since the firms' incentive to lay workers off is determined by the net layoff tax, f − τ .
However, as long as firms are homogenous (unlike in Section 3.3) and there is a single activity (unlike in Section 4),
from the government's budget constraint, and so the concepts of full or partial Pigovian taxation are identical under the two definitions.
In deriving the optimal layoff and payroll taxes, one must again distinguish between the cases when the firms have deep or shallow pockets.
Deep pocket firms.
If A > A * , firms have deep pockets. Choosing f = μ and τ = 0, and so a unit contribution rate c = f/μ = 1, leads firms to choose the production efficient productivity threshold. This is standard Pigovian taxation.
Shallow pocket firms.
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The rest of the section assumes that firms have shallow pockets but sufficient net worth that investment is undertaken (A * * * ≤ A < A * ).
Here we distinguish between two situations:
ex post bargaining (Example 1). Under ex post bargaining, the sharing of profit between the firm and its investors exhibits opportunism (financing contracts are thirdbest optimal). Consequently, one of the goals of government policy is to partly correct for the distortions associated with opportunism. In this respect note that the entrepreneur's ex post rent in the event of continuation depends not only on the realized income y, but also on the cut-off y and therefore on government policy; ex ante bargaining (Examples 2 and 3). By contrast, the ex ante contracts associated with stealing and/or perks and prestige from office are renegotiation proof and thereby second-best optimal. This feature, as we will see alters the implementation of the optimal allocation.
Ex post bargaining
Under ex post bargaining, the firm and the investors share the gains from continuation and the cut-off y is given by the ex post bilaterally-efficient continuation policy, given the government's policy:
• If A * > A > A * * , firms choose the productivity threshold so as to satisfy the financing constraint and the free entry condition with equality. Using the government budget
and the bilaterally-efficient continuation policy rule,
The contribution rate is lower than 1.
• If A < A * * , then only the financing constraint is binding. In this case, the optimal cutoff, is given by y * , and
The wage and the unemployment benefit must adjust one-for-one as A decreases (dw/dA = 1 where
The key result is that when firms have shallow pockets the optimal contribution rate is below one. Let us perform some comparative statics on the gross contribution rate (the same results hold for the net contribution rate).
And so ∂c/∂ȳ < 0 given that y ∈ [b, y * ] implies that the numerator of the fraction is increasing and that the denominator is decreasing in y. The optimal scheme makes firms more accountable when governance improves and when firms become wealthier (have stronger balance sheets).
Finally for A < A * * ,
It can be checked that the same comparative statics with respect to β and A hold. 
Ex ante bargaining
In Examples 2 and 3, there is a conflict of objectives between the entrepreneur, who would like a more lenient continuation rule, and the investors, who would prefer to liquidate more often (or at least not less often). Let N(y) and R(y) denote the net productivity and rent for a given government policy {f, μ, τ }:
where, recall, r(y) ≡ βy in Example 2 and r(y) ≡ B in Example 3, and more generally r(y) is weakly increasing, with less-than-unitary increments.
To implement the optimal allocation and when A * > A ≥ A * * , {f, μ, τ } must satisfy the government's budget constraint as well as:
Note, first, that (13) is always satisfied, given that N − R = N − R and y satisfies (8).
Similarly, (12) is always satisfied given that N(y) = I + m and given the government's budget constraint. So we are left with the government's budget constraint and (14) and (15). Using the former and substituting into the latter, we obtain:
Because r(y) ≥ y − b > 0 (since the optimum is at or to the left of y * ), we see that
Pigovian taxation, with a unit contribution rate (c = μ f = 1), implements the optimum.
For A < A * * , (12) is no longer binding, and the same reasoning leads to the same conclusion.
Proposition 3. Under ex ante bargaining (including Examples 2 and 3), Pigovian taxation (μ = f ) yields the social optimum. In other words, the government extends a liability
equal to the full externality to the intermediary.
Extension of liability
Finally , The proof of Proposition 4 can be found in the Appendix.
Heterogeneity and cross-subsidies
Suppose now that there are "strong" and "weak" firms, in proportions (ρ, 1 − ρ). The productivity distributions for these two types are G H (y) and G L (y), respectively, where G H dominates G L in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (the firms differ only in this distribution). While financial intermediaries can tell the two types apart, the government cannot; the best the government can do is to offer an incentive compatible
which firms self select. By contrast, it is still socially optimal to offer undifferentiated unemployment insurance μ and thereby induce a uniform wage w in the economy. With obvious notation, the policy must satisfy the government's budget constraint:
As usual, welfare (μ) is equal to social surplus,
minus the rents enjoyed by the firms compared to the absence of investment.
To compute the strong firms' rent, which is determined by the payoff they get by mimicking the weak types, let us assume for simplicity that their productivity is sufficiently high that they face no credit constraint when mimicking the weak type; and so their cutoff
[The reasoning generalizes to the case in which mimicking the low type makes the high type credit-constrained.] The high types' rent is then
is the net layoff tax for the weak types. Furthermore,
(with strict inequality if the weak types are credit constrained).
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Note that the derivative of the strong types' rent with respect to f L ;
is strictly positive, and so it is optimal to choose f H as small as possible, that is such
Maximizing the difference between social surplus and rent with respect to 
Proposition 5. Firm heterogeneity leads to less than full Pigovian taxation, and this even under ex ante bargaining.
Proposition 5 extends a similar result obtained by Blanchard-Tirole (2008) in the absence of agency cost. Cross-subsidization through less-than-full-Pigovian taxation thus also holds in the presence of extended liability. Intuitively, a high contribution rate/ internalization generates high profits for those firms that are unlikely to lay off workers.
Incomplete Pigovian taxation helps redistribute income from firms to workers.
Absence of extended liability
Intuitively, while the presence of an intermediary eliminates the problem of judgmentproofness, there is a tradeoff between the benefits from extended liability and the extra burden of imposing a monitor on the firms. Quite generally, we can assume an expected rent R 0 (y) in the absence of monitoring, with R 0 < 0 and N(y) − R 0 (y) single-peaked, with some maximum at y * 0 > b. For conciseness, we will restrict attention to Example 1.
18 The rent is also reduced by decreasing Δ L , i.e., by increasing
Note though that the strong type's rent must be equal to
so Δ L and Δ H , for given y L , f L and μ are given by this equality.
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In Example 1:
The cutoff y is such that the firm is indifferent between keeping the worker and paying w + τ in wage and payroll tax and dismissing the worker and paying f in layoff tax:
Because y − (w + τ ) = −f , the firm when continuing has enough cash to pay the wage and payroll tax: y + f ≥ w + τ for all y ≥ y. A non-monetary punishment (say, jail) suffices to discipline the manager and force him to pay the wage bill even though y is not observable by the State.
Furthermore, letting σ denote the job creation subsidy, 19 the layoff tax cannot exceed the entrepreneur's remaining wealth:
and so, using the State's budget constraint:
After some manipulations and using the full insurance condition, this yields the following program:
We thus conclude that Proposition 1 applies, but for different values of the thresholds.
In particular, the firm has deep pockets whenever
19 σ is needed whenever A < I.
20 Note that here
and the revenue-maximizing cut-off is now y * 0
As for the net contribution rate c 0 = (f − τ )/μ, it is independent of σ (so one can without loss of generality take σ = 0 for A ≥ I and σ = I − A for I > A), and as long as the financing constraint is binding (so y > b):
It is interesting to see what extended liability does. The direct effect is to allow higher layoff penalties. For a given threshold, budget balance implies a lower payroll tax.
Combined, these effects lead to fewer layoffs (y < y 0 ). This increase in ex post efficiency is to be traded off against the extra cost imposed on the industry by the monitoring requirement.
The extension of liability to other industrial companies: snowball effects
Liability is often extended to industrial partners as well as financial intermediaries. This section focuses on a specific issue: the possibility of snowball effects. While our treatment of financial intermediaries has so far assumed perfect diversification, this section allows the guarantor's activity to be affected by the failure of the tortfeasor. In the context of unemployment insurance this lack of diversification raises the concern that even if the guarantor can pay the layoff taxes, it will do so at the expense of its own activities. For example, in order to pay the layoff tax associated with the closing down of firm 2, firm 1 may choose to close its otherwise healthy activity.
n-activity set-up
There are n industrial firms , i = 1, · · · , n, each with one activity and one job. Each firm has asset f ≡ A − I ≥ 0, invests I and hires one worker.
We will assume that firms perfectly monitor each other and so there is no agency cost among them. They form a coalition and thus can be described as a single firm (the "coalition"). Thus, an alternative interpretation of this model is one of a single firm with multiple activities or plants.
Stochastic structure. We make the following assumption on the joint distribution of productivities:
Nested uncertainty structure. With probability p k (k ∈ {0, ..., n}, n k=0 p k = 1, p 0 > 0), exactly k jobs are potentially viable; their common productivity y is drawn from distribution G k (y) with density g k (y). The (n − k) other jobs are very costly socially and must be suppressed.
The lack of diversification is consistent with the idea that firms with related activities are best placed to monitor each other. The nested uncertainty structure corresponds to a two-dimensional adverse selection problem: The government observes neither the number of viable activities k nor the productivity y in those activities.
The number of non-viable activities, n−k, can be called the breadth of the productivity shock. The depth of the productivity shock for a given k will be measured by the hazard rate 1−G k (y) /g k (y). The breadth and the depth of the productivity shock are positively (negatively) correlated if a smaller (larger) number of viable activities corresponds to a worse distribution of the productivity parameter y in those viable activities; that is (for positive correlation) when < k:
This condition can be rewritten in terms of elasticities of (the supply of) layoffs:
for all y.
A positive correlation then refers to a higher elasticity of (per-activity) layoffs when fewer activities are viable.
Public policies. On the government side, the State pays unemployment benefits μ. The State observes only the number of layoffs. When the coalition retains employees and dismisses the (n − ) others, the State levies payroll tax τ (that is, τ per employee)
and layoff tax (n − )f n− (that is, f n− per layoff). Naturally, what matters is the total
made by the coalition. Indeed, and assuming as earlier the absence of macroeconomic uncertainty (there are many such coalitions), the government's budget constraint writes:
where y k is the cut-off for the k viable activities. In the economy, a fraction p k of coalitions have k viable jobs. A fraction G k (y k ) of these shut down, creating deficit n(μ − f n ) for the unemployment insurance fund. A fraction 1 − G k (y k ) keep their k viable jobs, generating kτ k in payroll taxes and net cost (n − k)(μ − f n−k ) in unemployment benefits.
Let (k, y) ≤ k denote the number of workers kept in state (k, y). Similarly, let U (k, y)
denote the ex post rent of the coalition when it has k viable activities with productivity y each:
From the envelope theorem,
By the same argument as before, the State is in a position to fully insure workers, and so it does. This implies that unemployment benefits are the same for all unemployed, irrespective of the state of the coalition that laid them off, and given by μ = w − b.
The snowball effect: heuristics
To illustrate the snowball effect and the possibility that layoff taxes encourage layoffs, consider the case of two firms/jobs (n = 2). For convenience, refer to coalitions for which both activities are viable (k = 2) as "strong coalitions" (although, of course, the productivity y of the two jobs may be low and so a strong coalition may still fire its workers), and to coalitions for which a single activity is viable (k = 1) as "frail coalitions."
Consider the ex-post strong coalitions' choice of laying off zero or two workers. 21 If they keep both workers, their profit is given by 2(y − w − τ 2 ). If they lay both workers off, their profit is given by −2f 2 . Thus, their threshold productivity is given by:
Ex-post frail coalitions face the choice of laying off one or two workers. If they lay one worker off, their profit is given by y − (w + τ 1 ) − f 1 . If they lay both workers off, their profit is given by −2f 2 . Thus, their threshold productivity is given by:
Equation (21) shows that the frail coalition is more likely to shut down altogether if the layoff-tax schedule is more concave, i.e., if f 1 grows keeping 2f 2 constant (which it will be, as we will show that 2f 2 = 2f forf small enough when n = 2).
This expression embodies the concern described earlier: An increase in the layoff tax f 1 encourages layoffs by frail coalitions. It creates a "spillover" or "snowball effect" on the otherwise healthy activity. Suppose for example that μ < 2f < 2μ. Then full experience rating is feasible for one layoff (f 1 = μ), but not for two (f 2 ≤f < μ). Applying experience rating to a single layoff implies a "layoff tax discount" and makes the second layoff rather cheap; for example if μ = 2f , then the second layoff is free.
Note also that if the State levies the maximum fine f 1 = 2f for a single layoff, then the coalition's continuation policy is limited by its ability to pay the worker:ȳ 1 = w + τ 1 .
With a lower layoff tax f 1 , the State could have made it possible (as well as privately desirable) for the coalition to cover the wage bill when the productivity is just below this wage bill. In this sense, the snowball argument captures the idea that layoff taxes take away what would have been paid to remaining workers.
The optimal allocation
Using the result that workers are fully insured, the State designs a mechanism so as to maximize U (b + μ). The workers' benefit (nμ) over and above their reservation wage (nb) is equal to the expected ex post value minus the coalition's utility:
where U is the coalition's ex ante utility.
22
An upper bound on the workers' utility is therefore obtained by solving:
Let θ and λ denote the (non-negative) shadow prices of constraints (22) (coalition's participation constraint) and (23) (coalition's incentive constraint), respectively.
22 One can envision the coalition as handing over its free cash flow nf to the government and deriving an ex post rent U . We will emphasize a different interpretation in the implementation, though.
The first-order conditions are
and for all k,
Condition (25) can be given a Ramsey pricing interpretation: The solution involves a trade-off between efficiency (which would call for y k = b) and rent extraction (related to the elasticity of layoffs,
Thus, y k ≥ b and the coalition maintains k jobs or none. (25) shows that the thresholds y k must all be equal: (22) is then binding, and so
where
Deep-pocket coalitions (as defined by (26)) fully internalize the cost of their layoffs.
Less-than-full internalization. For shallow-pocket coalitions f < f * , λ > 0 and so .
The State in a sense maximizes the tax revenue, so as to redistribute it to workers. f * is given by
While it delivers a number of new insights, the multi-activity analysis also generalizes the single-activity one: Full internalization obtains for firms with strong balance sheets; layoffs become more likely as the balance sheet deteriorates, until the pledgeable income is maximized.
Proposition 6. Under the nested uncertainty structure, the optimal cutoffs satisfy: 
The shape of the layoff tax schedule: how much extended liability?
We now turn to the implementation of the allocation derived in Section 4.3 through a "layoff tax schedule". The implementation of the optimal policy in the case of deeppocket coalitions is straightforward: It suffices to levy layoff tax f = μ per layoff. The government's budget is then balanced and the firms select the socially optimal destruction margin (y k = b). Let us therefore turn to the more interesting case of shallow-pocket firms.
As we noted earlier, firms care only about the total payment T when activities remain in operation. Thus, and quite generally, we cannot identify a layoff tax schedule without making an assumption on the payroll tax schedule. We accordingly (and reasonably) assume that the payroll tax schedule is linear:
Let F m ≡ mf m denote the total layoff tax for m layoffs.
We begin with the case of independent distributions, and then generalize the analysis.
Independent distributions.
Suppose that G k (y) = G(y) for all k. The optimal policy can then be implemented by linear payroll and layoff taxes:
For any k, the choice of a cut-off is the same as in a one-activity firm:
Using (20) and (28), the government's budget constraint becomes in the independent case:
For f ∈ f * , f * , in equilibrium, y is given by (22) and (23) combined:
μ (and therefore w = b + μ) is given by:
When f < f * , then y = y m and
Finally, conditions (28) and (29) yield f = f and τ .
Negative correlation between depth and breadth.
Let us choose the layoff tax schedule {F m } and the per-worker payroll tax τ so that with k viable activities, the cutoff y k makes keeping the k activities and shutting down a matter of indifference:
To check for incentive compatibility, we must verify that all "downward incentive constraints" (DIC) are satisfied:
This amounts to
which is indeed satisfied if y k is decreasing in k (negative correlation).
Rewriting (33):
and so the average cost of incremental layoffs (full closure) is increasing in k, i.e., decreasing with the number of layoffs. Put differently, the per-layoff tax decreases with the number of layoffs.
Positive correlation between depth and breadth.
Let us now choose the layoff tax schedule {F k } and the per-worker payroll tax τ so that the "downward adjacent incentive compatibility constraints" (DAIC) are binding:
For all k:
Let us show that if the cutoffs are increasing in k (positive correlation), then (DAIC) implies more generally that the (DIC) constraints are satisfied:
if y k ≥ y k−1 . And so forth. Thus if the cutoff y k is increasing in k (positive correlation), the allocation is incentive compatible.
Furthermore, the marginal layoff tax, F n−k+1 − F n−k , is decreasing in k, that is increasing in the number of layoffs: the layoff tax schedule is convex.
Extended liability. Recall that the model admits two interpretations: one with a single, multi-activity firm, and another with n single-activity firms. The latter allows us to discuss extended liability. Note first that in the case of independent distributions, it is optimal to treat the firms separately and levy per-layoff tax f : 24 There is no extended liability.
More generally, let us posit that each firm that shuts down pays its maximal layoff tax f and let us normalize the layoff tax schedule in a natural way:
25
F n = nf and F 0 = 0.
When the per-layoff tax decreases with the number of layoffs, the layoff tax paid by a firm that retains its workers while m firms shut down,
is positive: liability is extended to other firms. It however is extended less and less as the number of layoffs increases.
When the layoff tax schedule is convex by contrast, the firms that retain their workers receive a break. This can be interpreted as a reduction in the payroll tax when other firms lay their workers off. 
Summary and conclusion
Should firms and their guarantors be made accountable for the full externality, as Pigou suggested? The argument in favor of this "generalized Pigou principle" is that the government should delegate the monitoring to a private party who, if made fully accountable, 24 We assume that f ≤ f * in the discussion of extended liability. Otherwise, full internalization at the firm level obtains and there is no extended liability. 25 When the (DAIC) constraints are binding (convex tax schedule), F n − F 0 = − n u=1 y u − w − τ ; choose the payroll tax τ so as to obtain F 0 = 0. In the case of a concave tax schedule, F n − F 0 = n y n − w − τ , so set τ such that f = y n − (w + τ ).
will write efficient second-best contracts with the firm. We validated this "delegation principle", but unveiled two limitations: First, it no longer holds if contracts between financial intermediaries and firms are not second-best efficient, as we illustrated through the case of ex post renegotiation. The public policy then plays a dual role of promoting Pigovian internalization and of facilitating the firm's access to a monitor. The contribution rate should then be less than unitary. Second, when firms are heterogenous, a limited taxation of externalities (again, a contribution rate below one) cross-subsidizes the weaker firms and limits the rents of stronger ones.
Second, tapping profits in another (monitoring) industrial company has its limits, as extending liability may extend externalities. Snowball effects were studied in a tractable nested-information-structure model of independent interest, showing that the liability should not be extended when the partners' failure conveys bad or no news about the guarantors' own activities. Overall, the case for extended liability is much weaker when the guarantor himself has a weak balance sheet and the structure of shocks makes propagation likely.
It was further shown that for a single, multi-activity firm, the per-layoff tax should decrease (be constant, increase) with the number of layoffs if the breadth and depth of productivity shocks are negatively (not, positively) correlated.
Needless to say, this paper does not exhaust the topic. Another reason why the private sector's exposure might optimally be limited is that the government, through its policies, affects the probability of creation of externalities (in the unemployment application, firm productivity and unemployment length depend on public policy), and therefore may have to be held accountable. Finally, the stochastic environment in our analysis of snowball effects (within a firm or a coalition of firms under extended liability) generated a two-dimensional adverse selection problem. More generally, the Pigovian analysis should develop multidimensional adverse selection modeling in order to analyze the optimal taxation of externalities in multi-activity environments.
Limited access to capital markets is an ubiquitous feature of developed and lessdeveloped economies. The widespread policy concerns about the impact of layoff or environmental taxes on financially fragile companies or of stringent prudential regulation on financially fragile financial institutions deserve more attention from economic theorists and empiricists. We hope that this paper will encourage further work in this direction.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4
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